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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The motivation of this thesis is to add on to the existing and versatile, yet still not consistent, 
literature on the link between firm performance and firm’s diversification strategy. Academics in 
corporate finance and strategic management have eagerly been studying for decades the effect of 
corporate diversification on firms’ market and accounting based performance measures. The 
studies have been made with varying methods and empirical results. The so-called diversification 
discount is quite tenacious and accepted theory in the literature, or at least had strong empirical 
backing in 1990’s in the U.S. markets. The theory suggests that diversified corporations operating 
multiple business segments in multiple product-markets have a discount in their market value 
compared to single-segment firms focusing only on one product-market where their core 
competencies lie (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995). 
In other words, the optimal strategy based on this theory is that firms should focus on one product-
market and let the investors diversify their portfolios. This is because investors can diversify to 
publicly traded stocks more cost-effectively at market prices, i.e. they don’t have to pay the hefty 
premiums to the current market price, which is the case in a typical corporate acquisition (Porter, 
1989). 
However, diversification discount theory was challenged later on by some researchers (e.g. Campa 
and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Miller, 2006), and hence, the theory of curvilinear relationship, 
an inverted U-shape1, between diversification strategy and firm performance started to gain more 
foothold in the academia. Inverted curvilinear relationship means that related diversification can 
improve the firm performance compared to focused firms, but when moving further towards 
unrelated diversification strategy, it starts to decrease the performance at some point (e.g. Rumelt, 
1982; Markides, 1992; Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000). This view is quite strongly supported 
in the recent literature, and especially in the strategic management literature that usually 
 
 
 
1 Inverted U-shape and curvilinear relationship indicates the shape of the line if focused strategy is in the 
left side of the x-axis, related diversification in the middle and unrelated diversification in the right side, when firm 
value or operational profitability is in the y-axis, and when related diversification gives the highest peak value. 
Regression models used in this thesis are linear. 
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approaches diversification from a resource-based view. This view means that business segments 
can be relatedly diversified if they share some valuable, rare and non-imitable resources in their 
operations, not just similar end-product market (Markides and Williamson, 1994; Miller, 2006). 
In the corporate finance literature however, there is a lot of evidence supporting the diversification 
discount hypothesis where both, related and unrelated diversification, destroy firm value (e.g. 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 2002). Moreover, there is also support for the 
assumption that related diversification could outperform unrelated diversification strategy, some 
academics arguing that related diversification generates positive and unrelated negative excess 
value (Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Some other studies however, show 
contradictory results suggesting that unrelated diversification could also create value under some 
conditions (Gomes and Livdan, 2004: Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). Therefore, it still seems to 
be under controversy, which corporate strategy is the optimal for the shareholders of the publicly 
listed companies: focused strategy or some level of diversification. 
Recently, some academics have also criticized the methods typically used in corporate finance 
literature to determine the excess value based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
industry peers (Villalonga, 2004). Moreover, the aim of creating a general theory for the optimal 
diversification strategy on average have been under a scrutiny, and instead researchers have 
provided insights that diversification choice could be endogenous and an outcome of the industry-
level environment and shocks combined with firm specific heterogeneous characteristics to be able 
to respond to those shocks (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002; Ahuja and Novelli, 2016; Schommer, 
Richter and Karna, 2018). When controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification decision by 
determining the probability of the firms to diversify, Campa and Kedia (2002) showed that 
diversification discount disappears or turns into a premium.  
All in all, I still believe that there are strong practical benefits for both, academics and practitioners, 
prompting from empirical study trying to explain with a novel approach to a methodology, which 
diversification strategy seems to yield the best results in terms of the firm value and operational 
profitability. In addition, my study is approaching the relationship more from the corporate finance 
theory perspective, thus the goal of trying to study motivations and results of firm-specific strategic 
choices at an individual level is out of the scope of this study, even though Ahuja and Novelli 
(2017) suggest this kind of approach in strategic management literature. Naturally, the optimal 
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strategic choice and degree of diversification cannot be the same for every firm, but understanding 
what could on average generate positive outcome is of beneficial use to managers considering the 
best diversification strategies in order to maximize the value of the firm, as well as to investors 
analyzing the investment decisions and allocations in their portfolio. 
1.2 Research questions 
As discussed above, the field of research on the relationship of diversification and firm 
performance has been under controversy and eager study during the past four decades. It is shown 
by a number of studies, that the level of diversification discount or premium is also dependent on 
the geographical markets and their features. For example, Lins and Servaes (2002) did not find 
any significant diversification discount in Germany in their study, while they found 10% and 15% 
statistically significant discount in Japan and in the UK, respectively. Moreover, Khanna and 
Palepu (2002) found that in Indian markets, conglomerates outperformed focused firms. As the 
majority of the studies and thus, the theory, are based on the U.S. capital markets, and none to my 
knowledge is considering only Nordic markets in published journals, I am interested in finding the 
answer to what the effects of different diversification strategies2 are to firm performance in the 
Nordics. Firstly, I am interested in the effect on the firm value, and secondly to the operational 
performance based on profitability measure. Thus, I have the following research questions 
directing my thesis: 
Research question 1: Which diversification strategy has been the best for the shareholder wealth 
based on the excess firm value in the Nordics after 2012? 
Research question 2: Which diversification strategy has been operationally the most profitable in 
the Nordics after 2012? 
Research question 3: What fundamental reasons are the sources for the performance effects of the 
diversification strategies? 
 
 
 
 
2 Focused corporate strategy is in this paper considered to be also one of the diversification strategies, 
 i.e. ”non-diversified” strategy. 
 
 
4 
 
1.3 Contribution to the literature 
My research contributes to this ongoing discussion of diversification strategy and firm 
performance linkage by utilizing a novel method for determining the excess market value and 
excess profitability of the diversified - vertically, relatedly and unrelatedly -  firms in relation to 
their focused peer group. I utilize a common analyst -method created by Kaustia and Rantala 
(2018) in forming the peer group for relative value and operational performance comparison 
methods. The common analyst -method utilizes the information externalities produced by equity 
analysts as they typically decide to focus on specific set of companies and industries sharing some 
fundamental features, i.e. being homogenous as a group, allowing the analyst to specialize and 
exploit the information collected in analyzing multiple equities at the same time. So, I measure the 
excess value by dividing the market value of the firm by its intrinsic value calculated from common 
analyst peer group median value multiples. This is exceptional compared to methods usually used 
in the literature in this field: researchers have been assigning comparable industry peer groups 
based on industry codes, typically SIC codes (e.g. Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Campa and Kedia, 2002). Then, normally excess 
value is constructed using Tobin’s q based measures or adjustments of it, where firm’s current 
capital market value is divided by its replacement cost (Lang and Stulz, 1994) or imputed value 
presented by Berger and Ofek (1995), where the relative value is based on SIC code industry peer’s 
multiples. Even though SIC code data is widely available and easy and quite effortless to use, there 
have been also critics towards it (Rumelt, 1982; Villalonga, 2004). 
SIC codes are categorized based on end product markets, but this is not always the best way to 
measure the comparability of the two different businesses, and in some SIC codes they can be 
quite misleading in producing homogenous peers. Good example of the misleading ability of the 
SIC code categorization is presented by Kaustia and Rantala (2018), when they show that Dolby 
Laboratories, a licensor of audio, 3D and other technologies to be used in Blue Rays and movie 
theaters, gets a SIC code under 6794, for “Patent owners and lessors”. The peers then are other 
patent owners, e.g. Choice Hotels International, which are operating in a totally different business 
context. Kaustia and Rantala’s method, however, generates peers that are also in the entertainment 
and media business, such as Time Warner and Viacom, which are actually vertically linked to 
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Dolby Laboratories in the value chain. Therefore, my novel approach to use common analysts -
method in forming the peer group is taking into account some of these critics in prior literature, 
and could be forming peer groups that are more homogenous in their characteristics and 
opportunities, and therefore similarly exposed to same industry shocks affecting the market values 
and operational performances of the listed firms. 
Moreover, my research contributes to the literature by looking into Nordic stock markets 
specifically, which have not been a target of published academic research in this field to my 
knowledge so far. As shown by many studies (e.g. Krishna and Palepu, 2002: La Rocca, La Rocca 
and Vidal, 2018), the effects of diversification strategy on firm value has been quite different 
depending on the geographic markets used. This is due to many varying country and market 
specific characteristics, such as the development of the capital markets, the strength of the local 
institutions, the enforcement of the investor protection and proprietorship laws and the share of 
insider or blockholder shareholders in listed companies (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Ferris, Sen 
and Thu, 2010). So, the current state and degree of the development in each of these characteristics 
is showed to affect also the value effect of diversification strategies. Therefore, study concerning 
only Nordic countries, although not fully homogenous group of countries, is of interest as well. 
Furthermore, as the time horizon of my study ended up being 2012-2018, I hope to bring new 
evidence on the diversification – firm performance relation also from the current business 
environment and trends, and see whether the results and theoretical explanations are still up to 
date. The time horizon of six last years was picked to follow a typical study made in the prior 
literature, to keep the manual work manageable, and it was also a result of the data retrieving 
limitations discussed in the Section 1.5. It is clear that the technological change has been rapid 
since 1990’s due to the establishment of Internet and due to the massively increased computing 
power of the computers to a situation where machine learning algorithms and other applications 
of artificial intelligence are shaping the way people live and how business operations are run today. 
Like Ahuja and Novelli (2017) write, majority of the diversification and firm performance 
relationship studies have been conducted on a pre-Internet era. Hence, they discuss whether the 
rapid development of the information communications technologies could have changed the 
coordination costs of organizing activities inside the corporation compared to costs of organizing 
these actions outside the corporation. Therefore, it is also highly interesting in this study to see 
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whether the traditional industry lines have been fading away or if the new emerging technology 
and service-based industries are affecting in a way that could change the understanding of the 
diversification strategies’ impact on the firm performance. I will also take the current technological 
innovations’ broad applicability and following change of business models into consideration when 
categorizing firms into groups of related, unrelated, vertical and focused firms in Section 4. 
1.4 Main findings 
This study builds on the extensive earlier literature on the diversification and firm performance 
relationship and provides empirical evidence on this relationship in the Nordics during 2012-2018. 
My empirical study shows that there seems to be evidence backing the diversification discount in 
the Nordic markets during this time horizon. The related and unrelated diversification strategy 
dummy variables in my sample indicate statistically significant negative coefficients, -0.22 and -
0.28 respectively, when regressed to the excess value of the firm computed from the common 
analyst based focused peers’ relative value. So, my findings suggest that diversification strategy 
decreases the enterprise value -22% in related diversifier group and -28% in unrelated diversifier 
group. The vertical diversification strategy in my sample does not generate statistically significant 
results from zero, even though it has a negative coefficient sign, and therefore cannot be interpreted 
to perform differently from the focused group. Thus, vertical diversification cannot be stated to 
neither destroy nor create firm value based on my empirical evidence. 
Moreover, I show that related and unrelated diversifying strategies are also outperformed by 
focused strategy in operational profitability, when measuring it based on common analyst peer 
group adjusted excess EBIT-margins. The diversification seems to lower the profitability 7.1% in 
related group and 7.4% in unrelated group when regressing the excess EBIT-margin on financial 
controlling variables and diversification dummies. Again, the vertical strategy is not significantly 
different from zero, and cannot be stated to perform worse or better than focused group, even 
though it has a negative sign in its coefficient. So, in both value and profitability measures, 
unrelated diversification is the worst performing strategy and related diversification slightly less 
negatively performing than unrelated. Overall, based on my empirical results, the focused 
diversification strategy can be said to bring the best results for the owners or the publicly listed 
firms. 
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My findings are consistent with many empirical corporate finance-related studies considering the 
diversification strategies’ relationship to firm value (e.g. Wernerfelf and Montgomery, 1988; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Schneider and Spalt, 2016), and suggesting that diversification reduces 
firm value, and is therefore suboptimal strategy for the shareholders. However, my findings 
conflict with number of studies made especially after late 1990s (e.g. Palich et al., 2000; Campa 
and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Miller, 2006), which have been suggesting inverted curvilinear 
relationship where related diversifiers could have diversification premium whereas unrelated 
diversifiers have discount, or that diversification discount arises from methodological issues. My 
findings are contradictory to this curvilinear theory I also hypothesized in this study, so I have to 
reject the basic assumptions made in my hypotheses. My results, thus, indicate that when 
classifying companies specifically into different categorical diversification groups - also more 
broadly to focused group - based on their shared technologies, knowledge or assets, and when 
using novel method to choose the peer companies, the results could support the diversification 
discount theory still prevailing in the literature. I have to still note that some limitations in the data 
collection process and amount of data points in an average peer group could diminish the 
applicability of these results in practice. 
In addition, I studied the sources for these value and performance effects, and found that the 
sources differ based on the diversification strategy chosen. I found that in related group, either 
cross-subsidization, information asymmetries or agency problems of divisional managers drive the 
underperformance. In the unrelated group, in turn, underperformance is more driven by increased 
coordination and administration costs combined with an underinvestment problem. Finally, in the 
vertical group, there is no significant under- or overperformance, and thus the transaction 
economic benefits between vertically integrated units are at least evened out by increased 
personnel costs and significantly lower investment rate, i.e. underinvestment problem. 
Interestingly, these operational sources are contradictory to the overinvestment theory suggested 
by e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995) and Schneider and Spalt (2016), but support some other justified 
theories for the sources of the diversification discount discussed more in detail in Section 5.3. 
My thesis also brings new evidence on the Nordic markets specifically, and indicates that the 
capital markets in the Nordics are in 2010s functioning quite similarly to the developed U.S. 
markets, where there is some supporting evidence that the efficient capital markets seem to value 
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focused firms. My findings in the Nordics clearly imply that capital markets in the Nordics are not 
behaving like the less developed ones in emerging economies, where academics (Krishna and 
Palepu, 2002; Akben Selçuk, 2015) have found strong support for diversification premium and 
thus, more effective internal capital markets for publicly listed firms. 
1.5 Limitations 
There are couple of issues that limit the extend of my empirical analysis and overall focus of my 
study. First of all, the endogeneity is shown to be a significant driver in diversification discount 
literature. The problem here is when it is not taken into account, it could be that firms that are 
already underperforming end up diversifying into new industries to escape the lost competition 
and to find more profitable use for their assets (e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Campa and Kedia, 2002). I, 
however, argue that firms could also seek to diversify in order to replicate their success in one 
industry into another one, as Miller (2006) also argues. Moreover, if firms diversify to escape the 
competition into another more suitable industry, they should be able to improve their performance 
or then their management just cannot find the right market position for these assets and thus, should 
be valued at discount. All in all, I accept that the endogeneity bias might have some role in the 
relationship, and I am not controlling this in the regression analysis in this thesis. 
Secondly and most importantly, the amount of data points ends up being one concern in this study 
also. In the data collection process, I had to accept the survival bias due to only getting analyst 
coverage for currently active equities in 2019. This skewness of data can be seen in the Figure 1 
in Section 3. Moreover, after I ran the common analyst –method to get the peer groups, I could not 
control how large peer groups I received. Then after categorizing firms into a diversification 
strategy groups, the peer group size had to be almost cut in half. This is because in order to obtain 
the diversification strategy effect out of the firm performance, I can only use the focused peers to 
find the different categorical (n-1 dummy variables) effects in the regression. Thus, the biggest 
limitation is that the average usable peer group size is only 2.6 in the final sample, and therefore 
the variation in relative values and peer adjusted operational figures is rather high. This, in turn, 
limits the economical practicality of the empirical results to a certain degree. 
One slight limitation to the replicability of this study is the somewhat subjective categorization 
method of diversification strategy groups. The categorical measure of relatedness, that limited the 
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strategic options to only four, may aggregate some information. Therefore, the degree of 
diversification itself is not fully included in the analysis in my study, although taken into account 
in the method when computing the related segments’ share of total revenue. So, the degree within 
the categorical groups might have played some role also in explaining the diversification 
strategies’ performance effect (i.e. in unrelated diversification group the share of the related 
segments’ sales of total sales can be anything from 0% to 70%). I, however, believe that the choice 
itself to operate diversified segments already incorporates majority of the organizational and 
operational impacts coming along with it, therefore I preferred this categorical approach to some 
continuous ones. 
Common analysts -method for determining peer groups also limits the ability to compare 
diversified firms’ individual business segments and their accounting figures to focused firms’ 
segments. That is because using that method I do not have value multiples and mean accounting 
figures for each specific industry segment like Berger and Ofek (1995) for example do calculate 
in their study. This drawback slightly limits the possibilities to interpret the fundamental reasons 
for discount or premium arising from each diversification strategy. I can, however, compare the 
different accounting figures in an aggregate corporate level at least to try to find out theoretical 
explanations to the empirical results. Moreover, the availability of such product segment 
accounting data varies a lot between Nordic markets and companies in Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, that would have anyway limited the segment level comparison in my study 
substantially. 
1.6 Structure 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the development of prior literature 
on diversification strategy and firm performance relationship, presents the currently prevailing 
main theories and their differences and introduces the potential sources for value and profitability 
effects of diversification in companies. At the end of Section 2, I will state the hypotheses of my 
thesis. Section 3 describes the data used in this study and how and where it was obtained, and 
presents the annual and categorical distribution of my final sample. Section 4 introduces in detail 
the methodologies used in this study and compares the chosen methods to the other possible 
methods used in the prior literature. Section 5 presents the empirical results of diversification 
strategies’ effect on firm value and operational profitability, explores the sources of the value and 
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profitability effect due to the diversification, and connects the results with the theories in the prior 
literature. Section 6 reports the robustness of my results and Section 7 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Definition of corporate diversification 
Companies have various ways to pursue growth in order to maximize shareholder value. One of 
the earliest academics to study growth strategies was Ansoff (1957), who presented four general 
strategies available for a company looking for growth and expansion. Ansoff stated that instead of 
considering just market for a product or customers, we should be interested in the product mission, 
that is the description of the job for the specific product to fulfill. He used aircraft corporation as 
an example, and stated that one of its missions is commercial air transportation of passengers. 
Ansoff continued that a firm’s product-market strategy is a joint statement of a product line and a 
set of missions which the products are planned to fulfill. Then, he presented the four product-
market strategies that can be pursued by corporate managers: market penetration, market 
development, product development and diversification. 
In market penetration, companies try to grow by increasing sales to its present customers or by 
finding new customers for present products, i.e. without departing from an original product-
market. Market development is a growth strategy in which the company is searching new markets, 
usually geographical, for its present product line, typically with some modifications in the product 
features. Product development strategy, in turn, means that a firm pursues to develop products with 
novel and different characteristics, but which still are working for the same mission while 
improving the performance of the mission. Then finally, diversification strategy means that a 
company will departure simultaneously from its present product line and from its present markets. 
The diversification strategy is distinctive to other three because it generally requires new skills, 
new techniques, new production facilities, and it almost always leads to changes in the physical 
and organizational structure of the business. Similarly to Ansoff’s theory, Gort (1962) stated that 
at the pure form, diversification is an act of pure investment without any operational connections 
between the plants. Ansoff also clarified that a typical well-performing company would employ 
some of these product-market strategies simultaneously. Some reasons Ansoff mentioned for firms 
to choose diversification strategy are e.g. to compensate for technological obsolescence, to utilize 
 
 
11 
excess production capacity, to reinvest earnings, to distribute risk and to obtain top managerial 
skills. (Ansoff, 1957.)  
Porter (1987) continued the past work made in the literature and studied the performance of the 33 
diversified American corporations. He explained that in the diversification strategy, companies 
enter entirely new industries via mergers and acquisitions, joint venture or internal build-up. He 
argues that corporate strategy is the overall plan for a diversified firm, and that diversified firm 
has two levels of strategy: business unit (competitive) strategy and corporate (companywide) 
strategy. Moreover, he concluded that corporate strategy is what makes the corporate as a whole 
add up to more than sum of its parts. He listed three conditions under which diversification strategy 
can actually create shareholder value. The new industry should be structurally attractive or capable 
of being transformed attractive, the cost of entry should not capitalize all the future profits, and 
either the new business unit should gain competitive advantage from its link with the corporation 
or vice versa. 
Porter also provided some strategic rationale options for diversification. The corporate 
headquarters could use portfolio management strategy where it supplies capital to the units, i.e. 
creates internal capital markets, and employ professional management techniques in them. 
Additionally, diversification could be chosen by a corporate to restructure the new unit which is 
underperforming or otherwise undeveloped, and create value by improving its operational 
performance. Furthermore, transferring skills and employees and sharing knowledge and activities 
are also mentioned by Porter for value creating diversification strategies. (Porter, 1987.) 
In addition to understanding diversification to only mean that companies enter totally new 
industries, some strategic management academics started to study the degree of relatedness 
between the business units of a diversified firms, and became to classify them based on the 
relatedness. Rumelt (1974), for example, classified firms into a four categories based on how 
related the different business units are, and presented single-business, dominant-vertical, relatedly 
diversified and unrelatedly diversified strategies. He explained that relatedness means the extent 
to which a firm’s different business lines are linked by a common skill, resource, market or a 
purpose. Moreover, he defined that diversification is a matter of degree of relatedness among the 
activities undertaken by a firm. Rumelt later (1982) argued that the appropriate level of product 
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diversity could be that which balances economies of scope arising from diversified operations with 
diseconomies of organizational scale arising from increased coordination costs. Markides (1992) 
also demonstrated that if a firm goes beyond the level of diversification where increased 
coordination costs outweigh economies of scale, the firm will suffer via decreased market value. 
In the corporate finance-related literature, academics also started to study the firm value effects of 
the diversified firms, classifying them as diversified only based on different SIC code industries 
of the business units (e.g. Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988).  
2.2 Major trends and theories for the diversification - firm performance 
relationship 
In the 1960s, American companies experienced a wave of large scale mergers and acquisitions 
when companies undertook a massive diversification programs. One following consequence of 
this merger peak was the prominence and popularity in creation of large conglomerate firms. 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995.) In the 1970s and 1980s, however, firms started to once again decrease 
their level of diversification (Schommer, Richter and Karna, 2018). The early strategic 
management literature stated that there was no significant relationship between diversification and 
firm performance, indicating that when firms became conglomerates and entered new markets, 
existing firms had no special advantages (Arnould, 1969). 
However, soon academically accepted theories around the diversification theme started to emerge 
in the literature. The resource-based view supported by Rumelt (1974) and later for example 
Markides and Williamson (1994), indicates that different business units drawing on the same 
resource, skill or knowledge can outperform firms with unrelated business units and even single-
segment businesses based on accounting metrics, suggesting a curvilinear relationship. Markides 
and Williamson (1994) went further than Rumelt, and argued that economies of scope is not 
enough for a long-term competitive advantage stemming from diversification, it is rather based on 
shared strategic assets between the units. These strategic assets should be able to act as a catalyst 
to the creation of new market-specific assets that are non-substitutable, non-tradable and costly or 
slow to imitate, hence acting as a base for competitive advantage.  
In addition, the transaction-cost economics theory explained by e.g. Teece (1980) suggests that 
when corporates have lower internal transaction costs to exchange common inputs and 
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competences than what these transaction costs would be in external open markets, firms are able 
to gain from diversification. External inefficiencies in transactions could arise from information 
asymmetries between the exchange parties, because it can be costly to provide or acquire 
information. According to Teece (1980), the circumstances under which internal transaction costs 
can be lower is possible when the production of two products is dependent on the same proprietary 
knowhow base (intangible asset), and when two or more products are produced using specialized 
indivisible asset as a common input. To put it more clear, when diversification exploit economies 
of scope that cannot be duplicated by equity investors on their own or that cannot be replicated via 
transactional markets, diversification could create shareholder value. (Teece, 1980.) All in all, the 
resource-based view and the transaction-cost economics are both in a way emphasizing the 
knowledge based, organizational capabilities that are mostly intangible when considering the 
operational benefits of the diversification. The firm performance was usually measured on 
accounting figures, like return on capital or equity, in the strategic management literature.  
However, in 1990s, corporate finance academics started to challenge the view that diversification 
and conglomerates are creating value for shareholders. Numerous studies using U.S. data 
concluded that diversification is actually destroying firm value, therefore providing empirical 
evidence on the diversification discount theory. For example, Lang and Stulz (1994) found a 
negative relationship between diversification and Tobin’s q measure, when comparing diversified 
firms to their single-segment industry peers. Berger and Ofek (1995), in addition, found a strong 
value loss effect due to the diversification, magnitude being between 13% and 15% of the firm 
value. The value loss in Berger and Ofek’s study was smaller for more relatedly diversified firms 
based on SIC codes in their study. They concluded that the source for the value loss was due to the 
overinvestment and cross-subsidization, i.e. suboptimal managerial behavior or inefficiencies in 
internal capital markets. Moreover, Comment and Jarrell (1995) found that firms which decided 
to refocus after their diversification action actually experienced increase in their firm value. Also, 
Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1997) found that average value of a company with multiple industrial 
segments was 5% lower than a comparable portfolio of focused firms. 
Therefore, and since the 1990s, the diversification discount theory has been among one of the most 
persistent and disputed theories. Also, because the diversification discount was mostly accounted 
to suboptimal decisions made by the managers in the finance literature, the third major explanation 
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for diversification, agency costs theory, received a lot of support. Agency problems issue was 
raised by Amihud and Lev (1981) already in the early 1980s, when they argued that diversification 
can be explained by the agency problems between managers and shareholders, and that managers 
diversify to protect their human capital. Jensen’s article on free cash flow and corporate 
governance (1986) continued the literature on agency problems, and he suggests that companies 
undertake diversification because the managers want to increase their private benefits they derive 
from the corporation. 
Since the late 1990s and especially in the 21st century, academics both in corporate finance and 
strategic management have been challenging the vastly accepted diversification discount theory 
with some empirical backing. Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) examined the past development 
of the research on diversification and firm performance, and argued that the curvilinear 
relationship is the most prominent one, where related diversification leads to a higher performance 
while unrelated diversification lowers it. The results were consistent when taking into account 
market and accounting based measures. Next, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) challenged the 
theory by arguing that much of the excess value loss due to the diversification occurs because firms 
that diversify through acquisitions buy already discounted businesses. Thus, they also casted some 
doubt on the standard assumption that divisions of conglomerates can be compared to stand-alone 
industry peers. Furthermore, Campa and Kedia (2002) continued also in the subject of selection 
bias, meaning that already discounted firms “self-select” to diversify in order to find more 
profitable use for their assets. This “escape hypothesis” was originally published by Rumelt 
already in 1974, when he argued that underperforming firms tend to escape the industries were 
they cannot compete into more attractive markets. So, Campa and Kedia (2002) therefore 
challenged the standard methods used in corporate finance literature, because they tend to miss 
this endogeneity of the diversification choice made by firms. When they control for endogeneity 
in their study, they found that when they jointly estimate the diversification decision and firm value 
effect, the diversification discount is more likely to be a premium. On the other hand, Miller (2006) 
points out that also high performance may encourage firms to diversify, because firms want to 
extend or replicate their competitive advantage into new markets as well. 
The use of SIC code based industry peers was also challenged by Villalonga (2004), when she 
used business information tracking series instead, and constructed more consistent peer business 
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units instead of relying on SIC code segments. Her findings gave evidence on the inverted 
curvilinear relationship as well, suggesting that there is a discount to unrelated (conglomerate) 
diversification, but a premium to related diversification. She utilized the imputed value method 
like Berger and Ofek (1995). Villalonga therefore shed new light on the measurement error that 
can come from firms’ tendency to aggregate segment data when reporting the performance of their 
operating activities. This strategic accounting theory indicate that diversified firms would appear 
as underperforming firms when compared to stand-alone peers due to this intentional aggregation 
of data. Other academics also criticize the methods typically used in the literature, and e.g. Ahuja 
and Novelli (2017) suggest that the effect of diversification strategy is best studied in a micro 
mechanism level. They argued that the aggregating studies lose some information, and the effect 
and success of diversification could be studied individually through the estimated operational 
synergies and how these targets were met later. Glaser and Muller (2010), in turn, argued that the 
use of book value of debt in enterprise value based measures underestimates the excess value of 
conglomerates, because the book value of their debt could potentially increase after the 
diversification action via lowered cost of debt leading to a higher overall enterprise value. 
Miller (2006) took a novel angle in explaining the diversification and firm performance, and 
studied the link between Tobin’s q and corporate’s technological diversity. He also stated that the 
greater the percent of tangible assets, the less value can be created via diversification. This 
assumption was justified with an explanation that capital intensive projects can be more easily 
funded in external markets, because no crucial information is revealed to the markets in capital 
heavy projects and therefore these projects are better governed through external markets. Miller’s 
(2006) findings support also a premium for related diversifiers, when he concludes that diversified 
firms with high share of knowledge based, intangible assets with broad applicability across 
industries can outperform diversified firms and also single-business firms with no such economies 
of scope. More recently, Schommer, et al. (2018) provided some support for the inverted 
curvilinear relationship, while also explaining that the levels of unrelated diversification have 
decreased and levels of related increased since the 1990s when a vast amount of studies were made. 
Their argument is that while the overall levels of diversification might have declined over time, 
the average firm performance effect for the ones using diversification strategies may have become 
more positive. 
 
 
16 
At the same time when there is a vast amount of literature on related and unrelated diversification 
strategies, the effect of pure vertical integration as a diversification strategy has not received as 
much of interest. Rumelt (1982) showed negative effect on firm performance from vertical 
integration, and Ilinitch and Zeithaml (1995) argued that business units that are in the same vertical 
part of the value chain are actually more similar to manage than those in different stages like in 
vertically integrated firm. This implies that more complexity is involved in managing vertically 
integrated units, and hence the coordination costs could increase. However, D'aveni and 
Ravenscraft (1994) argued that the positive integration economies arising from vertically 
diversified strategy could slightly outweigh the increased administration costs, and lead to a 
marginally better profitability. Shackman (2007) more recently studied the relationship of capital 
market development and vertical integration, and suggested a positive relation between them. 
Shackman also points out that vertical integration actually increase commitment to a specific 
industry instead of diversifying the risk away. Overall, the effect of vertical integration strategy to 
a firm value has not yet received a consistency in the literature, but it can be considered to perform 
close to unrelated diversification strategy, since the coordination costs could increase via increased 
complexity. All of the methods using SIC codes are actually considering vertical integration as 
being part of the unrelated group, further giving backing to the assumption that they perform 
similarly. However, I am separating these strategies in my thesis. 
2.3 Geographical differences in the relationship 
Until the late 1990s, most of the diversification – firm performance papers were studying only the 
U.S. markets. Therefore, it started to interest academics whether the effect is existing also in 
European and Asian or emerging markets. Lins and Servaes (2002) were among the first to apply 
this study into the other parts of the world, namely the U.K., Germany and Japan, using data for 
1992 and 1994. They found that the diversification discount was statistically significant in the U.K. 
and Japan, 15% and 10% respectively. In Germany, however, they did not find statistically 
significant discount. They explained that in Germany, the higher share of concentrated insider 
ownership of the firms may be the reason why the diversified firms are governed more strictly, 
and thus the discount does not exist there. Moreover, Khanna and Palepu (2002) were using Indian 
markets with their rather weakly functioning institutions and thus, severe agency and information 
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asymmetry problems. As they hypothesized, they found that the most diversified Indian business 
groups outperformed focused comparable firms based on accounting and stock market measures. 
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) studied samples from six Western European countries and examined 
also the relationship of the external environment on diversification and firm performance link, 
namely factors that facilitate transformational activities, and institutions that encourage 
transactional activities. They suggest that the home country business environment is an important 
factor affecting the outcome of the corporate diversification strategies. They found a negative 
effect on firm performance from product diversification in developed environments and positive 
in less developed environments. Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2003) reported similar 
relationships as well. Ferris, Sen and Thu (2010) also looked into the external environment, and 
found that firms in less developed nations are more likely to diversify, implying higher benefit of 
internal capital markets in economies where it is costlier or difficult to raise external capital. The 
overall value effect in their study was still that industrial diversification reduces excess value. 
Akben Selçuk (2015) confirmed the results shown by Wan and Hoskisson (2003) with data from 
emerging markets, and concluded that there seem to be a diversification premium for diversified 
firms compared to single-segment industry peers in emerging markets. 
Overall, there seem to be two kind of geographical markets for corporate diversification: 
developed economies with functioning capital markets and institutions, and less developed 
economies with poor institutions where it is beneficial to utilize internal capital markets via 
diversification. Finally, La Rocca, La Rocca and Vidal (2018) underlined this assumption, when 
they researched Italian markets and showed that related diversification can be value destroying 
strategy due to the inefficient decision-making, but that conglomerate strategies (i.e. unrelated) 
increase the firm value because of the poorly functioning financial markets in Italy, and because 
the benefits of the internal capital markets. 
Next, I will present the main theoretical arguments provided in the literature for the sources of the 
diversification discount and premium in the organizations, some of them also mentioned in the 
previous Section 2.2. 
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2.4 Sources of the diversification discount 
To begin with, Jones and Hill (1988) explained the discount by stating that diversification beyond 
a certain degree increases internal administration and governance costs to the point where 
performance suffers. Hoechle, Schimid, Walter and Yermack (2012) discuss also that the discount 
can be partly explained by poor corporate governance. They control for governance level in the 
firms in their study and find that the discount diminishes. Moreover, when a firm is entering a new 
market with a little connection to its main business, it often times lacks some managerial resources 
and knowledge of the industry to overcome the competition there (Santarelli and Tran, 2016). As 
an operational cost evidence, Schoar (2002) pointed out that conglomerates exhibit 8% higher 
salary costs on average, and that this might cause the reduction of productivity in the diversified 
companies. 
Stulz (1990), however, argue that diversified companies are investing too much in business units 
with weak investment opportunities. This is especially true if managers have a lot of cash resources 
or unused debt to undertake these value-decreasing projects. Therefore, the units with weak 
outlook have access to more capital than they would on their own. Berger and Ofek (1995) also 
found evidence that suggest the overinvestment in diversified firms’ business segments is one of 
the main reasons for the diversification discount. Similar findings are presented later by Schneider 
and Spalt (2016), who also argue that conglomerates invest more in high-skewness return segments 
than their comparable stand-alone companies, leading them to trade at discount. They consider 
overinvestment to be created by CEOs’ long-shot bias, e.g. hubris. Connected to the 
overinvestment argument, Jensen (1986) suggests that due to the easier access to free cash flow, 
diversified firms end up investing more in negative net present value projects than what the 
segments would as stand-alone companies. Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) also point out that 
in a conglomerate, capital will flow also to failing business segments, i.e. these segments are cross-
subsidized by the better performing segments. As an independent firm, the failing segment would 
before long end up being distressed. Thus, a publicly listed single-segment firm cannot have 
negative equity value like the failing but subsidized segments can keep destroying the overall firm 
value as a part of a conglomerate.  
Overinvestment and cross-subsidization are very much connected to the agency problem theory, 
where the incentives of the agent and the principal are not aligned. Typically, this means that 
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managers and shareholders’ incentives differ, because managers are more risk averse over their 
human capital, or because they could engage in empire building via diversification to obtain private 
benefits. Since unrelated diversification could relax the credit constraints leading to more capital 
under the control of the management, the private benefits could be created this way. (Stein, 1997.) 
But agency problems exist also between corporate headquarters and managers of the business units 
in a diversified company. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) model these agency issues in their study 
and show how the division managers can subvert the functioning of internal capital markets with 
their rent-seeking behavior. When they employ this kind of rent-seeking behavior, the division 
managers can increase their bargaining power and their total compensation from the firm CEO. 
Interestingly, Scharfsetin and Stein’s model also imply that there exists “socialism” kind of 
allocation in internal capital markets, meaning that the weaker divisions get subsidized by the 
stronger ones. Rajan et al. (2000) added that internal power struggles can be a significant factor 
distorting the allocation of capital between the divisions. They continued that if the divisions are 
similar with the level resources and opportunities, internal capital markets will succeed in 
allocating the resources to most efficient divisions. But when the diversity in these metrics 
increase, resources will flow from divisions with good to divisions with poor investment 
opportunities. 
Finally, as discussed by Myerson (1982), the information asymmetries between central and 
divisional managers are inevitable in decentralized firms, and that these costs could cause 
diversified firms to have lower profitability than what the divisions could have separately. They 
stated also that the argument is the same for related and unrelated diversifiers. Overall, 
diversification discount theories suggest that focused firms have better transparency and thus, 
external markets are able to monitor them effectively and take controlling actions to prevent 
management of destroying shareholder value. Such available corporate control actions for 
investors are e.g. company takeovers, leveraged buyouts and managerial turnover (Lamont and 
Polk, 2002).  
All in all, theories suggest that the diversification discount could come from e.g. increased 
coordination, governance and administration costs, suboptimal managerial decisions, information 
asymmetries between the divisions and headquarter, overinvestment, cross-subsidization or from 
other sorts of agency problems. 
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2.5 Sources of the diversification premium 
On the other hand, there are quite many sources for the potential diversification premium 
mentioned in the literature. Starting with the internal capital markets justification, e.g. Weston 
(1970) explained that diversified firms have internal capital markets that allow them to allocate 
capital more effectively than what is possible via external markets. Stulz (1990) continued the 
argument and stated that when creating larger internal capital markets, diversified firms are 
capable of alleviating the underinvestment problem raised by Myers (1977), leading to more 
positive net present value investments undertaken compared to what the divisions would make as 
separate firms. Furthermore, Stein (1997) argues that internal capital markets could sometimes 
work more efficiently when the corporate headquarters manages a small and focused set of 
projects. Stein also explains that unlike a bank, headquarters can engage in “winner-picking” 
among the projects, and actively shift the funds from one project to more promising one, making 
the allocation of scarce resources more optimal. Thus, the headquarters can create value even if it 
cannot relax the overall credit constraints of the corporate. 
And what comes to the relaxing credit constraints, various academics have suggested that 
diversified firms benefit from imperfectly correlated earnings streams, and can due to this 
“coinsurance effect” obtain higher levels of leverage from debt financiers than focused peers of 
same size. More levered firm can create shareholder value through higher interest tax shield. (e.g. 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Aivazian, Qiu, Rahaman, 2015.) Aivazian et al. (2015), however, point 
out that the benefit from coinsurance effect on diversification is non-linear, so as the extent of 
diversification increases, the cost-benefit decreases. Another way the coinsurance effect could 
create value is via lower corporate-wide tax payments. Berger and Ofek (1995) explained that 
conglomerates are predicted to pay less taxes than the segments would if they were operated 
separately. This is because a conglomerate can reduce the losses made somewhere from the 
earnings generated elsewhere. 
Other possible theories for diversification premium suggested in the literature include the 
economies of scope arising from the common knowledge, skill or strategic asset used in different 
segments. The employment of these kind of economies of scope could lead to a long-term 
competitive advantage and thus, above average profitability for example via lower relative 
operating, marketing or channel management costs (Rumelt, 1982; Markides and Williams, 1994.) 
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Moreover, as Miller (2006) explained, intangible knowledge-based assets and broadly applicable 
technologies in diversified firms can be the sources for better operational performance. In addition, 
the utilization of common knowledge and technologies can lead to lower R&D costs in relation to 
group sales for related diversifiers, like e.g. Bettis (1981) and Campa and Kedia (2002) show in 
their studies. 
All in all, the effect of diversification on firm value is at the end the sum of the negative and 
positive effects arising from internal capital markets or sum of the effects from scope economies 
and use of strategic assets versus increased coordination costs, agency problems and complexity 
in organizations. 
2.6 Hypotheses 
Based on the above discussed reasons and prevailing theories in the prior research, I think it is fair 
to carefully assume that related diversification could outperform focused, vertical and unrelated 
diversification strategies due to the economies of scope that cannot be imitated. I thus, assume that 
some kind of inverted curvilinear relationship exists also in the Nordics in 2010s between firm 
value and its diversification strategy. I believe that Nordic economies and financial markets are 
rather developed compared to e.g. Italy and India, where researchers found diversification 
premium. Therefore, I form the following two hypotheses for which I try to get empirical evidence: 
H1: Related diversification strategy is positively linked to firm performance based on firm excess 
value 
H2: Unrelated and vertical diversification strategies are negatively linked to firm performance 
based on firm excess value 
Then, continuing the study of the diversification’s effect on firm value, I am also interested in 
finding out the implications to operational performance. In the prior literature (e.g. Palich et al., 
2000) there are quite strong evidence backing up the theory that related diversifiers enjoy also 
better operational profitability, while unrelated and possibly vertical strategies could lead to worse 
operational performance. Hence, I assume that the inverted curvilinear relationship could exist also 
when studying the profitability. I form my next two hypotheses as follows: 
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H3: Related diversification strategy is positively linked to firm performance based on excess 
profitability 
H4: Unrelated and vertical diversification strategies are negatively linked to firm performance 
based on excess profitability 
3 Data 
3.1 Sample selection 
In this thesis I decided to study diversification strategies’ effect on firm performance specifically 
in the Nordic countries, excluding Iceland due to its small number of listed equities. The rationale 
of doing this is to get larger scope and amount of observations to my study compared to only 
studying e.g. companies listed in Finland. Although Nordic countries are not completely 
homogenous group of business environments (e.g. different currencies, natural resources and 
industry specializations), they are all considered developed economies and also welfare states that 
share some essential societal structures and have a lot of trade between them. Moreover, there are 
many companies that are interrelated across the borders of these countries. Therefore, I included 
all the publicly listed equities in the four major Nordic exchanges, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo 
and Stockholm, between years 2012 and 2018 into my sample. The time period is chosen to study 
the effect of this phenomenon with the latest data possible while getting still enough observations. 
The vast majority of the research made on diversification strategies’ effect on firm performance is 
from the earlier time periods, so it is of interest to see whether the current economic and 
technological development have made some changes to the relationship. 
So, I started my data collection by retrieving all the listed equities during 2012-2018 in the 
abovementioned stock exchanges from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Similarly to common 
practice used in this field of academia, I excluded all the financial, insurance and real estate firms 
with SIC Codes between 6000-6999, because they cannot be compared with the same accounting 
metrics to other industries and because the nature of their operations is quite different. This left 
me with 1,377 listed equities. 
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3.2 Analyst coverage sample 
To proceed, I obtained data on the equity analyst coverage of the sample firms and excluded the 
ones with no analysts following them. This is because I use the common analysts -method to 
determine my peer groups, explained more specifically in the Section 4. The analyst coverage data 
is also from Thomson Reuters Eikon, with the limitation that it only provided real-time data, i.e. 
analysts following currently active equities (no data on discontinued equities) without specifying 
their starting year of following the specific firm. This limited the sample size substantially, but for 
the common analysts -method to generate enough peer groups, I had to make an assumption that 
the analysts have been following the same firms since the beginning of 2012 or since the beginning 
of his/her analyst code to become active if later than 2012, to 2018 or to the year the analyst code 
became passive. Naturally, if the company was listed some year after 2012 and the analyst was 
currently following it, the assumption was that the analyst started to follow the firm once it became 
public. 
This assumption is not truly realistic, but it gives a good estimate what firms the analysts have 
actually followed during these years. As the analysts tend to specialize in one industry or set of 
related firms (Boni and Womack, 2006), it is unlikely that they have totally changed their coverage 
during just seven years. After completing this phase, I had 467 firms, 2,959 firm-analyst pairs in 
2018 and altogether 10,386 observations in my sample when taking all the annual observations 
into account. So, on average each firm had 6.33 analysts following them in 2018 and one analyst-
firm pair was present on average 3.66 years between 2012 and 2018. Due to the analyst coverage 
real-time limitation, the sample is annually skewed to the latest years (see Figure 1). 
The next step in my study was to utilize the analyst coverage sample to run the common analysts 
-method simulation to get the peer groups. This reduced the sample size quite much, because there 
are many small firms with very little coverage, because the analyst coverage is not as extensive in 
the Nordic countries as is the case in the U.S. capital markets used by Kaustia and Rantala (2018) 
and because the analysts following Nordic companies often seem to focus mostly on one 
geographic stock exchange or the stock exchange of their domicile, lowering the possibility of 
cross-border peers simulated by the method compared to the U.S. markets. In total, the simulation 
generated peer groups for 224 firms with at least one yearly observation during the time period, 
with the mean peer group size being 4.82. In the peer groups, there were altogether 204 individual 
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firms from which only one was not itself having a peer group of comparable firms. This is because 
the common analysts -method does not require mutual relationship for the identified peer firms: it 
is possible that firm A has firm B as a peer, but firm B does not have A as a peer (Kaustia and 
Rantala, 2018). As can be seen from the Table 1, I also had to omit firms that did not have focused 
firms as peers, since I need to separate the diversification strategies’ effect from focused strategy 
and from each other. This reduced the final sample size with extra 81 companies together with the 
ones that did not have fully usable data for the empirical analysis, and thus I ended up with rather 
small final set of 143 study firms and correspondingly 81 focused firms that could be used as peers 
to define the excess value and profitability measures. Table 1 presents the “waterfall” from all 
publicly listed Nordic equities to my final sample size. 
Table 1: Sample selection 
Sample Characteristics 
Number of 
firms 
Publicly listed equities in Nordics 2012-2018 (excl. Iceland and financial 
firms) 
 1,377  
Excluding passive equities and ones without analyst coverage  (910) 
Excluding equities not passing common analyst -simulation  (243) 
Excluding firms with no focused peers or with missing data points  (81) 
Study sample  143  
 
3.3 Categorization to different diversification strategy groups 
After simulating the peer groups for 224 firms, I needed to categorize each firm into one of the 
four diversification strategies discussed more closely in Section 4. Because the categorization was 
made based on the segment sales of the firms, I first utilized Thomson Reuters Datastream database 
to obtain product segment based SIC codes reported by the companies to initially classify all the 
firms with only one reported segment into a focused group. Then, I collected segment sales 
information from firms’ IFRS-standard annual reports manually for all the firms with sales in more 
than one segment. Based on this data, I was able to categorize the firms into a correct group using 
method derived from Rumelt’s (1974, 1982) methodology widely used in diversification studies. 
At the end, I was left with 674 firm-year observations to be used in my empirical analysis. The 
apparent skewness towards the most recent years in my sample can be observed in the Figure 1. 
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Moreover, interestingly around 41% of the sample firms are classified to focused strategy on 
average throughout the time period, making it clearly the largest group in every year except 2012 
and 2013. Related diversification (32% on average) seems to be the second most popular strategy 
among the Nordic companies, followed by unrelated (16%) and lastly vertical (11%) 
diversification strategies. 
Figure 1: Distribution of sample firms annually and categorically 
Figure 1 shows how my final sample of study firms is divided annually between 2012 and 2018, and categorically to 
diversification strategy groups focused, related, vertical and unrelated. The categorization was made based on 
modified Rumelt’s method (1982). 
 
3.4 Accounting and market data for the regression variables 
Finally, I could use the created sample to run regressions to find out the statistical effects of the 
different diversification strategies. I used the total enterprise value to accounting measure multiples 
to calculate my dependent variable in my regressions like, for instance, Berger and Ofek (1995) 
and Lins and Servaes (2002), and used various accounting measures as controlling variables in 
addition to the categorical diversification strategy dummy variables as independent variables. 
Observations used in the regression were year-end market values regressed to year-end annual 
accounting figures. The accounting measures used in my empirical analyses were fiscal year end 
annual sales, total assets, EBIT, EBITDA, capital expenditures, total debt, selling, general & 
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administration costs, total salaries paid, R&D costs and intangible assets as well as the total year-
end enterprise value, and were retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Due to some 
missing data points in Eikon, some firm-year observations have to be removed, especially in the 
peer groups and some also in the sample firms that were in the scope of the study. When calculating 
value multiples for peer group firms, I removed all negative values and also clear outliers in the 
sample, for instance, EV/EBITDA over 50x, EV/Sales over 10x and EV/Assets over 8x. The limits 
were not scientifically chosen, I only use my own judgement to justify that excluding the multiples 
above these quite abnormal levels, the standard deviation in the peer group multiples decreased 
notably. This on the other hand reduced the data points for peer comparison, but in my opinion 
gives a more realistic estimate of the value multiples after all, because value multiples are sensitive 
to outlier values i.e. very small or close to zero EBITDA makes the multiple extremely high while 
the actual firm performance have been rather weak. Negative values and extreme outlier results 
were also removed from sample firms’ figures. Extreme outliers (closet to + or – 100%) were 
removed also when I calculated the excess profitability measures based on EBIT-margin. 
4 Methodologies 
There were a couple of significant decisions to be made which specific methods to use in order to 
conduct my study. The main decisions relate to how to measure the performance of the distinctive 
diversification strategies, i.e. what measure and what comparable group to use to indicate the 
superiority of a one strategy to another, and how to separate the companies into the different 
diversification strategies. As discussed already in the literature review in Section 2, the results of 
the studies in this field have varied quite notably based on the different methods used. In addition, 
academics have challenged the use of some methods, e.g. the use of SIC codes as a basis for 
focused peer groups (Villalonga, 2004). Next, I present the methods I ended up using in my thesis 
and the rationale behind the choices. 
4.1 Method for defining peer groups 
The use of SIC codes in determining the focused comparable companies for each of the diversified 
firm’s business segments have been under a scrutiny, although this method is widely used in 
finance side of the literature in this field examining the effect on market values. One reason for a 
critic is due to the “strategic accounting bias” suggesting that the value discount of diversification 
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may arise because managers aggregate their operations purposely in segments in a way that 
underestimate these segments’ performance when compared to same SIC code single-segment 
firms. Managers may want to make it harder for competitors to get insights into their business by 
reporting this way strategically, and this ultimately distorts the results. (Villalonga, 2004.) In 
addition, change from one SIC code industry to another is not standard per se meaning that some 
industries with same two-digit SIC codes might be very similar whereas some industries with same 
three-digit SIC codes might look like they have nothing in common. Rumelt (1982) points out this 
shortcoming of using SIC codes as a measure, and indicates that they implicitly assume equal 
dissimilarity between different SIC classes. 
However, in order to reliably research the risk-adjusted effect on the market values, the industry 
effect needs to be taken into account by comparing the value to some peer group which reacts 
similarly to exogenous shocks (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Despite the critics, majority of the 
significant studies considering diversification’s effect on firm value have used SIC codes based 
comparable companies to calculate the excess market value or Tobin’s q of the sample firms (e.g. 
Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Miller, 2006). Because of the critics and the accepted, wide use of the SIC codes in 
determining the peer groups, I wanted to approach this issue from the novel angle and contribute 
with a new method which has not yet been used in determining the peers to see if this adjusts the 
results somehow. Therefore, I follow Kaustia and Rantala’s (2018) common analysts –method to 
simulate the peer groups for my sample firms based on their common equity analyst coverage. 
So, Kaustia and Rantala (2018) also challenged the mere usage of standard classification systems 
in defining comparable companies in the academic finance literature. They state that most common 
classification systems have been e.g. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, Fama-
French industries, The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the leading 
privately provided solution, Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). However, they argue 
that peer firm identification is not that simple task since industry boundaries are constantly 
changing, and because totally new industries emerge while some others are withering. Kaustia and 
Rantala (2018) explain that equity analysts’ coverage choices can act as a natural measure for 
company relatedness, because they reflect sophisticated professionals’ views on industry 
boundaries and similar characteristics between firms. Furthermore, they suggest that in addition to 
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accounting figures, the coverage choices could also reflect other aspects of similarities between 
firms, such as customer segment focus (local vs global), business model (producer vs distributor) 
and vertical links between firms. They also argue that the coverage choices made by equity analysts 
reflect and adapt to the emergence of novel firm clusters and changes within individual firms also. 
Hence, the analyst coverage decisions create positive information externalities to the market that 
can be used to more accurately generate comparable set of companies. (Kaustia and Rantala, 2018.) 
Because of all these benefits, Kaustia and Rantala created a method which fulfills the following 
criteria: to generate homogenous groups in observable and unobservable characteristics, firms 
within a group would be related via real economic links and that the method would react promptly 
to the changes happening in firms and in the structure of the economy. Thus, they developed a new 
method based on the common sell side equity analysts of companies. They tested its performance 
against the abovementioned widely used conventional classification methods, and added also a 
text-based network industry classification method (TNIC) that measures product-market similarity 
by doing a textual analysis of the firms’ 10-K statements. 
Kaustia and Rantala (2018) found out that their analyst method outperformed every standard 
classification system in producing homogenous peer groups using data from New York Stock 
Exchange between 1983 and 2013. They used some market based measures and various accounting 
measures to assess the homogeneity of the simulated peer groups of their method, and stated that 
the results were statistically and also economically significantly better when using their common 
analyst -method. Authors also suggested that the method could be beneficial when studying the 
relative valuation of firms, which is exactly the purpose of my study. To illustrate the actual benefit 
of the model and how the analyst-based peers are economically related, they showed a case 
example for a firm Newell Brands. Newell Brands is a global consumer marketer selling a number 
of different product brands from pens to healthcare via retailers. Its common analyst –based peer 
firms included Procter and Gamble, Kimberley Clark and Colgate Palmolive, which are also global 
consumer good giants selling brands via retailers. On the contrary, none of these companies are in 
the same SIC code category with Newell Brands, not even based on the first digit SIC code. Hence, 
it is reasonable to assume that the method could create economically significant peer groups for 
studying the diversified firms’ value in relation to common analyst –based focused peers, and that 
this would be an interesting addition to the current literature. 
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The method is constructed by comparing analysts’ actual coverage choices to the coverage choices 
simulated randomly in a statistical software (1,000 intervals). Hence, the method identifies firms 
that have more common analysts following them than what would be expected by pure chance. 
Peer groups generated are year- and firm-specific and as said, independent of standard 
classification systems. The method is also self-organizing because there is no need to specify the 
size of the peer groups ex-ante, the method itself creates the limit of how many common analysts 
are needed for the specific firm-pair not to be classified peers by chance. (Kaustia and Rantala, 
2018.) The only decision I had to make was to define the confidence level, which is the probability 
that the two firms are classified as peers by chance. I used 5% confidence level opposed to 1% 
used by the authors, because my sample size is significantly smaller. This parameter affects the 
group size and closeness of the generated peers, but slightly lower confidence level could be 
accepted to receive enough observations from the simulation.  
Kaustia and Rantala (2018) managed to get peer groups for 69% of U.S. based NYSE firms, 
whereas I got peer groups for 48% of the Nordic listed firms left in my sample in that phase even 
though I loosened the confidence level a bit. Obviously, the limitation mentioned in the Section 3 
that analysts tend to cover typically firms mostly in one geographical area is clearly visible in the 
simulation results as well, and that definitely limited my resulting sample size also. Still, there 
were major cross-industry and cross-border peers in the groups in some cases which indicates that 
the common analyst -method can actually provide new and more accurate peer groups to be used 
in empirical analysis. For instance, there are strong interrelations in a heavy machinery and 
industrial cluster between Swedish and Finnish firms, where Swedish firms like Atlas Copco, Alfa 
Laval and Sandvik and Finnish firms like Metso, Wartsila and Valmet were often peers to each 
other, even though most of them are in the different two-digit SIC industries. Moreover, for 
instance Swedish construction company Pandox had altogether eight peers from which five were 
Swedish, two Norwegian and one Finnish, implying that the cross-border interrelations were 
followed by analysts also in some industries. 
4.2 Method for categorizing diversification strategies 
There are two major ways in the literature to define the diversification of the firm: categorical or 
continuous methods. In the categorical methods the purpose is to classify firms into a pre-specified 
number of diversification strategy categories, e.g. related, unrelated and focused introduced first 
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by Wrigley (1970) and followed with his own modifications by Rumelt (1974 & 1982). The 
continuous methods are measuring the degree of diversification for instance between zero and one, 
and are typically following a formulas based on segment sales, e.g. Entropy measure and 
Herfindahl-index used by Jacquemin and Berry (1979). The simplest method is to count the 
number of business segments firm is reporting and divide firms into the single-segment and multi-
segment categories. This count method has been in a wide use in the diversification’s firm value 
effect focused literature (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Campa 
and Kedia, 2002). Another common method used is, direct or some kind of modification of, 
Rumelt’s categorization method (e.g. Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; De, 1992; Mayer and 
Whittington, 2003). 
I used categorical method preferred by strategic management academics in my study instead of 
continuous or count based methods more typically used in diversification’s firm value effect 
studies in corporate finance. There are critics and support for every method, and it depends 
ultimately on researcher’s objective which method to choose. For example, Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson and Moesel (1993) compared the applicability of Rumelt’s categorical method, SIC code 
based count method and continuous Entropy measure, and concluded that Entropy measure and 
Rumelt’s method should lead to the acceptable results. Rumelt’s method received also some 
criticism for its validity from Chatterjee and Blocher (1992). Palepu (1985), in turn, states that 
continuous index measures are useful because their simplicity, objectivity and replicability while 
he combines Entropy measure and Rumelt’s category in his study. The same qualities are the 
strengths of a method based on segment counts.   
Categorical methods, where strategies are classified by the ratios of the related and dominant 
segment sales, are naturally more or less semi subjective, because there is no clear rule to follow 
what operations are actually related to each other. But on the other hand, these methods could 
provide much more consistent groups when the effect of different diversification strategies and 
focused strategy is sought after, not just the difference between diversified group and non-
diversified group (Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). Furthermore, continuous methods like Entropy 
measure do not take into account the mode of the diversification, i.e. are the business units related 
or unrelated to each other and are they vertically or horizontally integrated, it only gives the 
diversification degree ratio. Thus, Mackey, Barney and Dotson (2017) argue that continuous 
 
 
31 
diversification measures are good at measuring differences in the degree of diversification, but less 
effective at comparing diversified strategies with focused ones. Hence, I chose to utilize Rumelt’s 
(1982) categorical method, which I modified slightly to my study. 
Figure 2: Rumelt’s categorical method for defining diversification strategies 
The categorical method Rumelt (1982) published has the following categories for diversification strategies: 
Symbol  Category    Ratio specification (% of revenues) 
SB  Single business    Rs > 0.95 
DV  Dominant vertical   Rv > 0.70 
DC  Dominant constrained  0.95 > Rs > 0.70; Rc > (Rr + Rs)/2 
DLU  Dominant linked-unrelated 0.95 > Rs > 0.70; Rc < (Rr + Rs)/2 
RC  Related constrained   Rs < 0.70; Rr > 0.70; Rc > (Rr + Rs)/2 
RL  Related linked    Rs < 0.70; Rr > 0.70; Rc < (Rr + Rs)/2 
UB  Unrelated business   Rr < 0.70 
 
Starting with the firm’s specialization ratio, Rs, it is the share of the revenue coming from the 
firm’s largest single business unit. Business unit is explained to be a product, product line, or set 
of product lines that share strong market interdependencies. A firm’s vertical ratio, Rv, is the share 
of a firm’s revenue attributed to its biggest group of products, joint-products, and by-products that 
are associated with same value chain of processing a raw material into a distributable end product. 
Then, a firm’s related-core ratio, Rc, is the fraction of its revenues that can be attributed to its 
largest set of businesses that share or draw on the same common core competency, skill or 
resource, or are linked by common market or purpose. Finally, a firm’s related ratio, Rr, is the 
fraction of its revenues that can be attributed to its largest set of businesses that are somehow 
related, meaning that each of the businesses in the group is related to at least one other unit in the 
group but which does not need exhibit any single common skill or resource. It has to be that Rs < 
Rv < Rc < Rr.  
I decided to make some simplifying modifications to the Rumelt’s method due to the smaller 
sample size because I can only compare firms to focused peers in my relative valuation while 
Rumelt only studied each group’s profitability based on accounting measures. This reduced my 
sample significantly because there were many firms with only peers that were classified as 
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diversified (e.g. all the Nordic tele operators Telia, Tele2, Telenor, Elisa and DNA are diversified 
vertically, thus could not be included in the sample as they were the only ones that acted peers to 
each other). Additional reasons to simplify Rumelt’s method were to make the categorization more 
straightforward and less subjective. Therefore, I used only four separate diversification strategy 
groups instead of seven presented by Rumelt’s method. 
Rumelt (1982) states that when making judgements of relatedness of business units, specific 
attention was paid to the absence or existence of common production facilities, shared selling 
groups and other tangible evidence of attempts to exploit common factors in the production. 
Because the operations are nowadays much more technology driven, I will go even further in 
judging the relatedness and argue that if the business units utilize a common core technology (e.g. 
expertise in low emission engines), platform (e.g. common online marketplace) or knowledge base 
(firm-wide expertise in programming or chemistry etc.) they are related even if these aspects are 
not tangible and clearly visible. Moreover, services are nowadays embedded in majority of the 
manufacturing companies’ businesses, meaning that service and production cannot be separated 
anymore, and they are in my study considered usually to be one “single-business” categorized 
under Rumelt’s specialization ratio, Rs, and under “focused” in my category. One great example 
of the change in manufacturing firms’ business strategy is the Finnish escalator and elevator 
manufacturer KONE, which draws almost half of its revenues from services provided to installed 
escalators and elevators as maintenance and renovation services. It means that KONE is getting 
sales from the same customers during the whole lifetime of the product. Therefore, KONE actually 
presents only one segment in its reporting, and thus, it is categorized as “focused” in my study. 
Figure 3: Modified Rumelt’s method to categorize diversification strategies 
I classify all the sample firms and the peers every year based on the following method after collecting all the annual 
segment sales for each firm and their segments: 
Category   Ratio Specification (% of revenues) 
 
Focused    Rs > 0.95 
Vertical    Rv > 0.70; Rs < 0.90 
Related    Rr > 0.70; Rs < 0.70 
Unrelated   Rr < 0.70 
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To give a little bit more idea how this semi subjective method was used in my study, I present 
some example companies for each of the group. As said, I collected the segment sales data 
manually from companies’ annual reports and classified the related ratios based on the business 
descriptions, strategies and core competencies. In the focused group are the ones that report only 
one business segment or whose revenue come over 95% from one segment. Moreover, if all 
functions are otherwise similar but only the end product is slightly different, I have categorized 
the firms as focused. Good examples of these kind of focused firms are the Danish pharmaceutical 
firm Novo Nordisk with couple of different medicines in its portfolio, and Norwegian Air which 
reports two segments with different three-digit SIC industries that can actually be considered the 
same business (non-scheduled 4522 and scheduled 4512 air transportation). In vertical group, the 
attention is put to see if the firm is vertically integrated to other parts of the value chain, and that 
the total revenue from vertically integrated segments is above 70%. If the firm has less than 10% 
of the revenue coming from e.g. wholesale or retailing in addition to its largest segment, it is still 
classified to focused group. One example of vertically integrated firm in my sample is the Danish 
container logistics and transportation company A.P. Moller - Maersk, which provides all sorts of 
services along the value chain from marine, inland and air freight transportation to terminal and 
warehousing services. 
For related group, my method follows the logic of Rumelt’s related ratio, so the business units 
need to be somehow related based on common skill, resource, market or purpose. The largest 
business segment cannot exceed 70%. Example company for this group is the Finnish pulp and 
paper firm Stora Enso, which has a number of products from paperboard packaging solutions to 
wood and paper products. The common resource here being the wood and knowledge how to refine 
it. Finally, the unrelated group also follows the related ratio, but these firms need to have less than 
70% revenues attributed to the related segments. Unrelated firms are also all conglomerates 
holding a portfolio of businesses that are independent and not related to each other. One example 
in my sample is the Norwegian consumer goods holding company Orkla that has brands for 
example in food, snacks, confectionery, biscuits, health, personal care, textiles, detergents and 
painting equipment product categories. 
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4.3 Methods for the relationship of firm performance and diversification 
strategy 
I measure the firm performance of the different diversification strategies based on relative market 
value approach and secondly, based on relative operational profitability metric. As already 
discussed in Section 2, there have been number of ways to measure the firm performance in the 
prior literature. The ones with most support have been relative “excess market value” methods 
measuring the excess value, among first used by Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) with Tobin’s 
q3 and Berger and Ofek (1995) with their measure of firm’s market value to sum of imputed values 
for its segments as standalone entities, and followed by numerous others after them. The imputed 
value calculates intrinsic market values for each segment of a diversified firm based on two-to-
four-digit similar SIC code industry single-segment firms. In the strategic management literature, 
various accounting figure measures, such as return on capital (ROC), return on equity (ROE) and 
return on sales (ROS), have been used to compare the firm performance.  
Even though these accounting measures are quite straightforward to calculate and easy to interpret, 
they are not fully employing the risk related to the firm’s operations. Other shortfall compared to 
market values is that accounting measures are always backwards looking and subject to managerial 
discretion. (Lang and Stulz, 1994.) Erickson and Whited (2006), in turn, challenge the use of 
Tobin’s q and argues that the diversification discount arises from the measurement error of Tobin’s 
q in studies using that measure of excess value. Tobin’s q is actually hard to estimate and interpret 
because the “replacement value of assets” is not a figure visible in the markets, and thus is a proxy 
at the best. 
Due to these reasons, I primarily utilize market value based excess value method to compare firm 
performances and to find out the effect on firm value, and secondly also look into the accounting 
based profitability. I have to hence assume that markets are efficient and that firm’s market value 
is representing an unbiased estimate of present value of its future cash flows. I cannot use imputed 
value method (which is impossible due to the common analyst method to define peer groups, it 
 
 
 
3 Tobin’s q is the sum of the market values of the firm’s equity and debt divided by the replacement cost of 
its assets. It takes into account intangible assets’ effect on market value (Lang and Stulz, 1994). 
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only gives peers for the whole firm, not for the segments) and decide not to use Tobin’s q because 
of the ambiguity to determine the replacement cost for assets. Thus, I use relative value method 
based on three value multiples calculated for the peer firms. Then, the median of these multiples 
is taken and the accounting figure of the study firm is multiplied by that to receive the theoretic 
intrinsic value of the firm. The natural logarithm of the actual market value of the firm divided by 
the relative value is taken in order to get the excess value. I use enterprise value4-to-assets 
(EV/assets), enterprise value-to-sales (EV/sales) and enterprise value-to-EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) 
as relative value multiples, following the multiples used by Berger and Ofek (1995) with the 
exception that they had EBIT instead of EBITDA. EBITDA is chosen to avoid too many negative 
values that are more likely to appear when using EBIT.  
Secondly, for the accounting based profitability measure, I calculate peer group adjusted EBIT-to-
sales (EBIT-margin) ratios in order to find out also the operational performance of the different 
strategies. Thus, I can better understand the relationship when utilizing both, market and 
accounting based, measures.  
 
 
 
4 Enterprise value is the sum of the market value of the firm’s equity plus preferred equity, minority interest 
and book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents, Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of financial variables 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of financial variables by diversification strategy used in pooled 
OLS regressions. Excess Value-% is the dependent variable in pooled OLS regression for firm value effect, Sales is 
the figure used to scale the other accounting metrics and together with Assets indicate the absolute size of the firm. 
EBITDA-%, Capex-% and Leverage-% are the control financial variables used in the regression to isolate the 
diversification strategies’ effect. 
 
Variable   Focused Vertical Related Unrelated 
Excess Value-% 
Mean 0.06 -0.07 -0.26 -0.37 
Std. Dev. 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.61 
Sales, M€ 
Mean 1,487 9,121 3,430 5,076 
Std. Dev. 2,712 18,224 3,806 4,392 
Assets, M€ 
Mean 2,102 13,445 3,814 5,187 
Std. Dev. 2,832 27,506 3,472 4,969 
EBITDA-% 
Mean 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.13 
Std. Dev. 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.11 
Capex-% 
Mean 0.28 0.10 0.11 0.04 
Std. Dev. 0.60 0.09 0.19 0.05 
Leverage-% 
Mean 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.22 
Std. Dev. 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.14 
      
No. of observations   286 105 207 76 
 
 
Table 2 already shows that focused diversification strategy seems to be the only one that on average 
gives positive excess value for the sample firms compared to focused peer group, although focused 
should in theory give close to zero excess value. Interestingly, the magnitude is very large and 
negative in related and unrelated group since excess values are negative 26% and 37%, 
respectively. It has to be noted that the standard deviation is also very large in every category, 
meaning that there is a lot of intra-group variation within the categories. Thus, the small amount 
of firms in peer groups seems to be causing a lot of volatility in the excess value measure. 
Secondly, Table 2 also shows that focused strategy has been superior to every other diversification 
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strategy based on EBITDA-margin, which is 30% on average in focused group. The second best 
EBITDA-margin mean is in the related diversification strategy, 21%, which is already significantly 
smaller. What comes to the sizes of the average firms in each category, it makes sense based on 
the prior literature and based on the rationale to diversify, that vertical and unrelated diversification 
strategies record the largest sales and assets figures, i.e. these firms tend to own more assets and 
therefore business segments under management. It is also reasonable that relatedly diversified 
firms on average utilize some common skills or resources and are smaller than vertically and 
unrelatedly diversified firms, but still larger than focused firms. Thirdly, it seems that focused 
firms are superior at investing in growth via fixed assets as well, since the average of 28% of sales 
is much larger than in any of the diversified categories. This could already imply some 
underinvestment issues in these categories, since they are also underperforming focused firms’ 
EBITDA-margin as well. The leverage figure is also highest in focused group surprisingly, but 
when taking into account the standard deviation, the difference does not seem that exceptional. 
However, this data is contradictory to theory presented by e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995), that the 
coinsurance effect of diversified firms could lead to higher levels of leverage due to the eased 
credit constraints when more imperfectly correlated cash-flows are under one management. Lastly, 
from the descriptive statistics it is already quite safe to assume that the hypothesized inverted 
curvilinear relationship, i.e. related diversification could outperform every other strategy based on 
excess value, does not seem probable as related group indicates large negative excess mean value 
when adjusted for peer group relative value. 
 
4.3.1 Pooled OLS regression for the value effect 
After I calculated the average multiples based excess values, I run pooled OLS regression for the 
panel data because I have cross-sectional and time-variant sample of observations. Pooled OLS 
panel data regression is chosen over fixed effect and random effects model since it seems to be 
most suitable one for my data. Fixed effect model cannot be used because it cannot have time-
invariant variables or variables with just a little variation annually. My dummy variables that 
specify the diversification strategies are often time-invariant for the sample firms during 2012-
2018, therefore making the model useless. Moreover, when taking the Hausman test for panel 
model to specify if the random effect model is suitable, the outcome is that the random model is 
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not consistent with a very low p-value. Thus, I rely on the results of pooled OLS regression in my 
study. 
The dependent variable in the pooled OLS regression is the excess value, i.e. natural logarithm of 
market value (MV) divided by relative value (RV) from peer multiples. Because I am studying the 
value effect of diversification strategies using only focused firms as peers, my peer group size is 
rather low, on average 2.6 peers, after omitting the other strategic categories from the peer groups. 
This leads to high variation in excess values and especially between the different relative values 
calculated with different multiples. Hence, in order to reduce variation and to get more robust 
excess value estimates, I take the average of the three excess values calculated using the three 
different multiples, and use this average in the pooled OLS regression. I utilize similar kind of 
controlling variables in my regression than Berger an Ofek (1995) and Lins and Servaes (2002) by 
including natural log of total assets to control for size, EBITDA-to-sales to control for profitability, 
capital expenditure-to-sales to control for growth opportunities and debt-to-total assets to control 
for leverage. The variables of interest are the three dummy variables of “Vertical”, “Related” and 
“Unrelated”, each of which is one if the firm is categorized into that diversification strategy group 
and zero otherwise. The equation used in the regression thus goes as follows: 
 ln (
𝑀𝑉
𝑅𝑉
) = ln 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  (1) 
4.3.2 Pooled OLS regression for the profitability effect 
Then, I also wanted to find out whether there are statistical differences between the profitability of 
the diversification strategy groups when compared to the focused group. Therefore, I need “risk” 
or “industry adjusted” profitability measures for the firms to see if they are over- or 
underperforming their own peer group. In my study, the industry is replaced with the common 
analyst peer group, which I hence use here as well. So, I measure profitability with EBIT-margin, 
which should be quite consistent and easily available measure of operational performance of firms 
across industries, taking into account the capital expenditure needs that are not included in 
EBITDA-margin for example, and excluding one-time items included in net profit figure. I take 
median of the peer firm EBIT-margins and deduct that from the same ratio of the sample firm in 
question. Then, I run similar pooled OLS regression with excess EBIT-margin as a dependent 
 
 
39 
variable and almost the same financial controlling and dummy variables (only EBITDA-margin 
left out):  
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇% = ln 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  (2) 
4.3.2 One-sample t-test and two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances 
To further try to find out the real source for the profitability or the value effect, I calculated also 
common analyst peer group adjusted operational metrics for all of the diversification strategy 
groups. More specifically, I used EBIT-margin, capital expenditures-to-sales, selling, general & 
administrative costs-to-sales, salaries-to-sales, research & development costs-to-sales and 
intangible assets-to-total assets ratios which were chosen based on possible sources for firm 
performance effects mentioned in the prior literature and discussed in Section 2. EBIT-margin was 
again used here to compare whether the average profitability margins differ also statistically from 
the focused strategy group. First, I calculated one-sample t-stats for the averages of all the peer 
adjusted metrics to find out whether they differ from zero. i.e. are these metrics statistically 
different from focused peer groups. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the average difference is zero 
in this test. To further confirm my results, I calculate t-stats to compare if there are statistical 
differences in EBIT-margins of different averages coming from different diversification strategy 
and focused groups. Because the variances are very different in magnitude in each of the strategy 
group, I end up using t-test with unequal variances.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Excess value method 
The pooled OLS regression results of the excess firm value on the diversification dummies and 
financial control variables are shown in the Table 3 below.  
Table 3: Pooled OLS regression results for excess firm value measure 
The dependent variable is excess firm value calculated by relative value method. Sample firms’ year-end assets, sales 
and EBITDA metrics are multiplied by peer group medians and the average of these three relative values is taken to 
be used as relative value of the firm. The natural logarithm of year-end actual enterprise value to this computed relative 
value represents the excess firm value. Then, the excess value is used in regression as a dependent variable. 
Independent variables are natural logarithm of total assets, Ln assets, EBITDA divided by sales, Ebitda-%, capital 
expenditures divided by sales, Capital expenditure-%, debt divided by total assets, Leverage, and then the 
diversification strategy dummies Vertical diversification, Related diversification and Unrelated diversification, which 
are each one when a firm is categorized to that strategy and zero otherwise. The t-stats of the parameter estimates are 
shown in the parenthesis. 
Variable   Pooled OLS regression 
Intercept  0.23* 
  (1.72) 
Ln assets  -0.05*** 
  (-2.86) 
EBITDA-%  0.34*** 
  (3.03) 
Capital expenditure-%  0.05 
  (0.82) 
Leverage  0.25* 
  (1.83) 
Vertical diversification  -0.01 
  (-0.20) 
Related diversification  -0.22*** 
  (-3.77) 
Unrelated diversification  -0.28*** 
  (-3.49) 
   
Adjusted R2  10.40% 
No. of observations   674 
Note  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Overall, the regression’s adjusted R2 is 0.1040 indicating that the controlling variables and the 
diversification strategy could explain only about 10.4% of the excess market values of the sample 
firms. It is, however, significant based on the p-value and in line with e.g. ones reported by Berger 
and Ofek (1995) between 2% - 11%. The regression results show that there are altogether five 
statistically significant explanatory variables, all but debt-to-assets at 1% significance level: ln 
assets (-0.05), EBITDA-margin (0.34), debt-to-assets (0.25), related (-0.22) and unrelated (-0.28) 
dummy variables. Thus, regression shows statistically significant negative coefficients for related 
(t-stat of -3.77) and unrelated (t-stat of -3.486) dummy variables, suggesting that these 
diversification strategies really have a negative effect on the firm value.  
The value loss on average arising from related diversification is hence 22% and from unrelated 
diversification 28%, meaning that the coefficients can be interpreted to be economically significant 
as well, i.e. have a meaningful effect on the value. My results are consistent with the corporate 
finance literature studies made around the 1990s (e.g. Wernerfelf and Montgomery, 1988; Lang 
and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2002) but also some studies made later 
in 2010s (Mazur and Zhang, 2015; Schneider and Spalt, 2016), suggesting that the diversification 
discount is a prominent phenomenon, both in related and unrelated strategies, leading to a value 
loss in these corporations. The magnitude of my diversification is, however, larger than reported 
by these studies, typically ranging between 5 - 15%. It can be that in Nordic countries the effect is 
existing and stronger, but the magnitude difference is probably due to the high standard deviation 
in my relative value measures due to the small number of focused peer firms on average. 
Some of these prior corporate finance related studies did not separate between related and unrelated 
diversification, but the ones which took it into a consideration (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Villalonga, 2004) found also that the diversification discount was typically lower for related 
diversifiers. The assumption that related diversification can outperform unrelated diversification 
is supported in my regression output as well, as the difference, 7%, between the two strategy 
dummy variables is statistically significant. These results, however, contradicts with my 
hypothesis of inverted curvilinear relationship backed and suggested by e.g. Palich et al. (2000), 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Miller (2006). So, these results imply that Nordic publicly listed 
diversified firms are not good enough at forming strategic assets or utilizing their shared 
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knowledge and technologies to create a competitive advantage in the markets compared to focused 
peers. 
Negative value effects from related and unrelated diversification were excepted after the overall 
very negative average excess values in these strategy groups presented in the Section 4 already, 
but the regression confirms that when all relevant financial measures are controlled for, these 
diversification strategies are driving the underperformance largely. Moreover, vertical 
diversification strategy does not have statistically significant effect on excess firm value, although 
the coefficient has negative but very small value of -0.01 with the t-stat of -0.20. Thus, the value 
impact of vertical integration strategy cannot be distinguished from zero, i.e. the value impact is 
not different from focused strategy.   
In addition, the results indicate that the firm size measured by total assets has a slightly negative 
effect on the excess value, consistent with the statistic that diversified firms are larger on average 
with multiple business segments under management. Then consistent with the intuitive assumption 
and previous studies (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995) that profitability increases firm value, EBITDA-
margin has strongly positive coefficient implying that one percent increase in EBITDA-margin 
increases the excess value by 0.34%. Leverage control variable implies also positive relation to 
the excess value at 10% level, which is consistent with the value creating impact of interest tax 
shield also discussed in Section 2. Only Capital expenditure-% investment opportunities control 
variable does not show statistical relation to the excess value but with a positive coefficient sign. 
5.2 Profitability approach 
The second object of my thesis was to study the operational performance of the different 
diversification strategies. So, I calculated the common analyst-based peer group adjusted EBIT-
margins to my sample firms and ran a pooled OLS regression using this excess profitability figure 
as a dependent variable as written in the Equation 2. In the Table 4 below is presented the 
regression results of this analysis.  
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Table 4: Pooled OLS regression results for excess profitability measure 
The dependent variable is excess EBIT-margin calculated by subtracting the peer group median margin from the 
sample firm’s margin. Variables are natural logarithm of total assets, Ln assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, 
Capital expenditure-%, debt divided by total assets, Leverage, and then the diversification strategy dummies Vertical 
diversification, Related diversification and Unrelated diversification, which are one when a firm is representing that 
strategy and zero otherwise. The t-stats of the parameter estimates are shown in the parenthesis. 
Variable   Pooled OLS regression 
Intercept  -0.05 
  (-1.07) 
Ln assets  0.01** 
  (2.11) 
Capital expenditure-%  0.10*** 
  (5.12) 
Leverage  -0.21*** 
  (-4.60) 
Vertical diversification  -0.03 
  (-1.21) 
Related diversification  -0.07*** 
  (-3.75) 
Unrelated diversification  -0.07*** 
  (-2.81) 
   
Adjusted R2  7.74% 
No. of observations   674 
Note  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
As can be seen, excess EBIT-margin measure gives similar results than excess value method 
earlier, more specifically related and unrelated dummies are again negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level while vertical strategy is not statistically different from zero but still with a 
negative sign. Coefficient for related strategy is -0.07 (t-stat -3.75) and for unrelated is -0.07 (t-
stat -2.81), meaning that their negative effect on profitability is on average 7% in both strategies. 
When looking at the third decimal, the effects are 7.1% and 7.4% for related and unrelated, 
respectively. This means that the order is in profitability effect the same: vertical diversification is 
not statistically different from focused strategy, and unrelated diversification is worse than related 
diversification, although their difference here is not statistically significant, i.e. null hypothesis 
that the average is the same in these groups holds.  
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Connecting these results also to the prior literature, they contradict clearly with e.g. Rumelt (1982) 
and Markides and Williamson (1994) who report improved profitability from economies of scope 
in related diversification, whereas I show significant negative excess profitability. Indirectly via 
present value of future cash flows, negative excess profitability for related and unrelated 
diversification strategies are in line with the value effect reported by e.g. Wernerfelf and 
Montgomery (1988) and Lamont and Polk (2002). 
Regarding the control variables, interestingly some change of coefficient signs happens here: total 
assets become positive and leverage ratio negative, statistically significant at 5% and 1%, as 
opposed to the excess value effect regression. The change in leverage ratio could be due to the 
usage of EBIT-margin, i.e. the tax deductibility of the interest expenses does not affect the EBIT-
margin, but can boost the shareholder value still based on free cash flows. Capital expenditure-% 
have again positive coefficient sign, but this time it becomes also statistically significant at 1% 
level indicating that investing more in assets create more growth opportunities and thus, possibility 
for profitability improvements. 
The excess profitability regression results confirm the large value losses indicated by excess value 
regression, because lower profitability due to the diversification should be reflected in market 
prices of the equities via lower future free cash flows available. This further backs up the 
assumption that the ability to create economies of scope via strategic assets or common inputs are 
not existing and thus not leading to a true competitive advantage in diversified firms in Nordics. 
Moreover, the internal capital markets do not seem to be more efficient than external markets in 
allocating capital in Nordics. The magnitude of the effect is quite consistent with the value effect 
presented above for related and unrelated diversification, -22% and -28%. The reason for smaller 
absolute percentages is that the accounting measure is backward looking and taking into account 
the yearly profitability effect only, whereas the market value takes into account all the future profits 
discounted to the present value, therefore the effect is cumulative and seems to be in line. Only 
major difference is that the performance effect of related and unrelated are much closer to each 
other in this regression output, i.e. the effect is pretty close to the same on average. The overall R2 
of the regression model was 0.077, meaning that the OLS model can explain around 7.7% of the 
variation. Therefore, the method is supeior at explaining the variation but is in line with the R2 
results of e.g. Rumelt’s (1982) regression model (R2 around 11%). 
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Overall, my empirical results from the pooled OLS regressions indicate that the diversification 
discount exists in the Nordic countries during 2010s, based on firm value and operational 
performance methods. Moreover, my first and third hypothesis, that related diversification is 
positively linked to firm excess value and excess profitability, have to be rejected in my sample. 
Thus, the alternative hypothesis that related diversification, rather than positively, is negatively 
linked to firm excess value and profitability have to be accepted. Considering the second and fourth 
hypothesis, that unrelated and vertical strategies are negatively linked to firm excess value and 
profitability, they can be only partially accepted because vertical diversification does not differ 
statistically from focused group. However, I can confirm my hypotheses that unrelated 
diversification is negatively linked to firm excess value and excess profitability.  
So, my findings5 are contradictory to my hypothesis and theory of inverted curvilinear relationship 
empirically backed by e.g. Rumelt (1982), Palich et al. (2000) Campa and Kedia (2002) and 
Villalonga (2004) and Miller (2006). My results of negative firm value and profitability effects of 
related diversification conflict with the positive effects found in this inverted curvilinear theory, 
but is consistent with the value destroying feature of unrelated diversification after all. However, 
the results are at the same time consistent with the corporate finance literature studying the 
diversification’s value effect (Lang ans Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). Furthermore, e.g. 
Rumelt (1982) reported also negative excess profitability for vertical diversifiers, which I cannot 
statistically conclude in my study.  
The interpretation of my regression results are however subject to some doubt on the sufficiency 
of my peer group data points, i.e. some of my peers have larger impact on the sample firms’ 
performance effects than others when there are only one or two peers in the group. This may lead 
to some performance bias and have to be noted when interpreting the economic indications 
  
 
 
 
 5 I conducted also regressions for geographical sub-segments of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The 
results were not significant, mainly due to the low amount of observations in some of the categories. 
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5.3 Theoretical justification of the results 
Since my regression results point towards significant negative effect arising from diversification, 
I next try to explain the sources for the diversification discount and connect my results to existing 
theories for value loss and worse operational performance mentioned in the prior literature and 
discussed in the Section 2.4 earlier. 
So, some possible theories for the negative effect on firm performance discussed earlier were e.g. 
increased coordination and administration costs, overinvestment, cross-subsidization, agency 
problems and information asymmetries. Agency problems and information asymmetries could 
lead to inefficient allocation of capital which could mean underinvestment discussed by Stulz 
(1990) in general (e.g. risk aversion of managers) or worse profitability due to the investments in 
lower or negative NPV projects, also assumed in cross-subsidization. Jones and Hill (1988) and 
La Rocca et al. (2018) for instance discuss this based on transaction costs perspective. They 
suggest that inefficient intrafirm transactions, costs from agency issues and coordination costs 
among business segments in addition to distorted incentives and lack of cooperation of divisional 
managers represent the reasons for benefits of diversification to be outweighed by the negative 
effects of diversification. 
Hence, I calculated common analyst based peer group adjusted operational metrics for my sample 
firms. More specifically I used excess EBIT-margin to find out if there are implications of 
ineffective capital allocation to project by internal capital markets, capex-to-sales to see if the 
diversified firms overinvest, selling, general & administration costs-to-sales to find out if there is 
signs of increased coordination costs and total salaries paid-to-sales to see if the increased salaries 
could imply the rent-seeking behavior of divisions and thus, distorted incentives of divisional 
managers. I also calculated research and development costs-to-sales and intangible assets-to-total 
assets just to see if there are signs of positive effect of diversification. Below in the Table 5 are the 
peer adjusted averages for each diversification strategy group and for each accounting based 
operational metric with one-sample t-stats presented in the parenthesis. 
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Table 5: Peer group adjusted average accounting measures by diversification 
strategy group 
Table 5 presents the mean accounting measures of different diversification strategies, adjusted by focused peer group 
median, i.e. the yearly peer group median figure is deducted from sample firm’s every yearly figure, and the average 
of all the firm-year observations is taken in each diversification category. EBIT, Capital Expenditures, Selling, General 
& Administration Costs, Total Salaries Paid and R&D Costs are scaled by firm’s sales to make them comparable, 
Intangible Assets are scaled by total assets. One-sample t-test is conducted for each metric in each category to find 
out whether they differ from zero, i.e. from focused peer group. The t-stats of the averages are shown in the parenthesis. 
Variable   Focused Vertical Related Unrelated 
EBIT-%  -0.006 -0.018 -0.054*** -0.060** 
  -(0.41) -(0.99) -(5.79) -(2.25) 
Capital Expenditure-% 0.020 -0.110*** -0.021 -0.041*** 
  (1.02) -(4.22) -(1.41) -(3.00) 
SG&A-%  0.012 0.026* -0.002 0.037** 
  (1.21) (1.93) -(0.22) (2.01) 
Total salaries-%  0.010 0.044*** -0.024** 0.020 
  (0.89) (4.38) -(2.53) (1.43) 
R&D-%  0.020 -0.053** -0.026*** -0.003 
  (0.92) -(2.62) -(3.12) -(0.81) 
Intangible assets-%  0.018 -0.017*** 0.024** -0.004 
  (1.47) -(2.65) (2.43) -(0.34) 
      
No. of observations   286 105 207 76 
Note   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
In the Table 5 the results vary quite a lot depending on the diversification strategy in question. 
Starting with the focused strategy group, all of the metrics are statistically insignificant from zero, 
which is the assumption of course because they are compared against focused peers, i.e. peers with 
similar strategy. Then, in vertical strategy group, we can see again that the EBIT-margin is not 
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significantly different from zero, even though it has a negative excess average of 1.8%. But it 
seems that vertical diversifiers invest much less compared to focused peers, because the average 
excess capital expenditure-ratio is -11.0% at 1% significance level implying underinvestment and 
possibly a risk aversion of managers. Vertical group has also significantly higher excess SG&A 
(2.6% at 10% level) and salary costs (4.4% at 1% level). It seems though that some transaction 
economies also suggested by D'aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) exist between vertical units in 
addition to 5.3% (at 5% level) lower R&D costs, and that these are evening out the higher 
personnel and SG&A costs. This is consistent with the insignificant value and profitability effects 
found in regression before. 
Continuing with the related diversification strategy, the average excess EBIT-margin is -5.4% and 
significant at 1% level. Interestingly though, both excess SG&A (-0.2%) and personnel costs (-
2.4%) have negative averages, personnel costs at 5% significance level meaning that the 
underperformance is not driven by rent-seeking behavior via higher salaries or increased 
coordination costs. Moreover, either overinvestment or serious underinvestment do not seem to be 
the problems, as the excess capital expenditure average is -2.1% but not significant. There is also 
evidence backing up the theory by Miller (2006) that relatedly diversified firms could enjoy lower 
R&D costs (-2.6% at 1% level) and higher share of intangible assets (2.4% at 5% level) due to the 
broad applicability of the technologies inside the corporate. 
Therefore, it seems that the worse profitability compared to focused peers comes from worse gross 
margin, i.e. from lower NPV projects, not from the personnel, coordination costs or over-
/underinvestment. The explanation for this could be cross-subsidization where the internal capital 
allocation is inefficient and underperforming divisions get more funding for their lower NPV 
projects than what is optimal for the firm, lowering the profitability. This could be a consequence 
of internal power struggles and information asymmetries. The results here are also consistent with 
the negative firm value and profitability effects reported earlier, and thus lower profitability is 
leading the firms to trade at discount. 
Finally, the unrelated diversification strategy also presents a negative average excess EBIT-margin 
of -6.0% at 5% significance level. Further, looking at the other metrics, it seems that 
underinvestment and higher SG&A costs (3.7% at 5% level) arising possibly from increased 
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coordination and administration drives the decreased profitability. Excess capital expenditure 
average (-4.1 at 1% level) implies a serious underinvestment issue possibly due to the managerial 
empire building, i.e. agency problems. Personnel costs and R&D costs do not differ statistically 
from peer group average. Thus, there seem to be rational reasons to value undiversified corporates 
at discount also due to their lack of growth investments and increased coordination costs. 
To connect these results with the prior studies, it seems clear that overinvestment suggested by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Schneider and Spalt (2016), cannot drive my results, since all of the 
diversifying strategies give negative average excess values for capital expenditure- ratio implying 
that rather underinvestment problem is driving the underperformance. I find evidence in related 
diversification group backing up the theories of inefficient internal capital markets or cross-
subsidization (e.g. Stulz, 1990; Myers et al., 1992; Berger and Ofek, 1995) and possible 
information asymmetry costs between the business units based on poorer EBIT-margin (Myerson, 
1982). Unrelated group indicate also poorer EBIT-margin suggesting that the internal capital 
markets are not efficient there either, but that also the theory of higher coordination and governance 
costs (Jones and Hill, 1988) based on excess SG&A costs and lack of growth investments are 
significant drivers there. The coordination cost explanation and underinvestment problems are also 
present in the vertical group. In addition, consistent with Schoar (2002), salary costs are on average 
higher in vertical group, suggesting existing agency problems (Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan 
et al., 2000). 
Lastly, I compared the sample means of focused strategy group to diversified strategies in excess 
EBIT-margin measure with the two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances (two-tail test) to 
further find confirmation for the worse operational performance of diversified firms in my sample. 
Overall, I can conclude that the negative average peer adjusted EBIT-margins in related and 
unrelated groups are statistically different from the average in focused group, related with  
-4.7 percentage points mean difference at 1% significance level, and unrelated with -5.3 percentage 
points mean difference at 10% significance level. Thus, it seems that the worse profitability in 
these diversification strategy groups is quite robust throughot. Again, in the vertical group, the 
-1.2 percentage points mean difference ended up not being significant.  
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6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to bring new evidence on the disputed field of reseacrhs in corporate 
diversification strategies’ relationship to firm performance. Even though the subject is vastly 
studied, there is not existing a theory that is widely accepted to be ultimately the truth based on 
strong empirical backing. I approached the subject from a novel angle, and challenged the 
conventional methods used in defining peer firms for excess value and profitability measures to 
be used in empirical analyses. I utilized a common analyst –method created by Kaustia and Rantala 
(2018) to define focused peer firms in my study. I also used publicly listed firms from only Nordic 
countries excluding Iceland to add on to the geographical distribution of the research as well.  
I categorized firms into a four different diversification strategies: vertical, related and unrelated in 
addition to focused firms. I utilized modified Rumelt’s (1982) categorization method in defining 
the strategy groups for my sample firms. My empirical results indicate that there seems to be a 
diversification discount assigned for Nordic companies in 2010s based on the excess value method 
and when controlling for the basic financial variables. The magnitude of a value loss is 22% for 
related diversification strategy and 28% for unrelated diversification strategy, when compared to 
the focused peer group. The vertical strategy does not generate excess value different from zero. 
These results differ from the inverted curvilinear assumption I made, and which has been one of 
the most discussed and backed theories among academics especially after late 1990s (e.g. Campa 
and Kedia, 2002). The results are, however, in line with the negative value effects arising from all 
diversification implied by studies made in 1990s by e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995). 
Furthermore, I studied the diversification strategies’ effect on operational profitability as well with 
excess EBIT-margin as a dependent variable. This study confirmed the excess value regression 
results, that related and unrelated diversifiers destroy value via negative excess profitability, which 
was -7% on average for both groups. Vertical strategy again was not statistically different from 
focused peers, although with a negative coefficient sign. So, the ultimate answer to my research 
question is that related and unrelated diversification have a negative effect on firm value, and that 
value effect comes via worse profitability. Therefore, despite the technological development and 
structural changes in manufacturing and service business models, the focused strategy has been 
the best for the shareholder wealth in the Nordics after 2012. 
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I also studied the sources for the profitability effect, and thus also what drives the diversification 
discount in my data. The conclusion is that internal capital markets created via diversification do 
not seem to be very efficient at allocating capital to most profitable projects in the corporations 
when compared to focused peers that can be more transparently monitored by external capital 
markets. 
I have to also point out that my study suffers from some data sufficiency limitations that affected 
the results and have to be noted when interpreting the economical practicality of my conclusions. 
Because the average size of the peer group in the excess value calculations was only 2.6, the 
variation in these measures were large. Therefore, the magnitude of the diversification discount 
was also clearly higher than what it has been typically in the prior value effect studies. I can still 
indicate from my results that these strategies seem to be underperforming the focused strtategy. 
For the further research, I suggest to continue challenging the methods used and perhaps combine 
common analyst –method with various others, e.g. continuous Entropy-method and SIC code 
based imputed value method to be able to bring more robustness and to more specifically assign 
the results for the actual issue or to the methods used. Since the share of the insider owners was a 
major driver for German diversified firms not to have a diversification discount (Lins and Servaes, 
2002), I would also suggest to include insider ownership to the analysis to see whether that changes 
the results in Nordics.  
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